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RECENT DECISIONS
Domestic Relations: Single Act of Cruelty as Grounds for Di-
vorce: The plaintiff-husband in Merten v. National Manufacturer's
Bank of Neenah' sued his wife for divorce. The wife counterclaimed
on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. While the husband
did not testify at the trial, the wife testified that on one occasion her
husband had struck her with the result that she had subsequently be-
come very nervous and upset. A witness offered corroborating testimony
as to the wife's health. The trial court granted the wife a divorce on
what it admitted was minimal evidence.
There had been an $8,500 property settlement in the case, made in
lieu of alimony. Subsequent to the decree, the wife was killed in an
auto accident and the husband moved to strike the property settlement
alleging that since it was made for the purpose of supporting his wife
there was no longer any need to complete it as ordered. When the trial
court denied the motion, the husband appealed, challenging the validity
of both the property settlement and the divorce.
In upholding the wife's divorce, the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Heffernan, stated that
The testimony upon which a finding of cruel and inhuman
treatment can be based is set forth in the statement of facts.
They are undeniably scanty: A bare statement that on one oc-
casion the offended spouse was struck and rather meager and
equivocally stated testimony that such treatment made the wife
nervous and upset....
Although the only evidence of cruel and inhuman treatment
was the striking of a single blow, a single act of cruelty may be
sufficient grounds for divorce. [citation omitted]
The trial judge had the parties before him and is in a better
position than we are to judge the effects of the acts [sic; act?]
alleged upon the other spouse. What might well in a less enlight-
ened age, or under different circumstances, merely constitute a
reasonable interspousal chastisement could constitute cruel and
inhuman treatment in the case .... 2
Cruel and inhuman treatment has long been grounds for divorce
in Wisconsin, but it appears that this is the first case to expressly state
that a single act may constitute cruel and inhuman treatment. One of
the problems that the Merten case raises is: what type of single act will
now justify a divorce in Wisconsin grounded upon cruel and inhuman
treatment? This article will attempt to answer this question by compar-
ing the rather inconclusive Wisconsin law on the subject with the de-
veloping law in other jurisdictions.
There have been three paths of development in the law of cruel
1Merten v. National Manufacturer's Bank of Neenab, 26 Wis. 2d 181, 131
N.W. 2d 868 (1965).
2 Id. at 186, 187, 131 N.W. 2d at 870, 871.
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and inhuman treatment in Wisconsin. In the first of these, the cases
appear to have required a course of conduct culminating in a single act
of violence. For example, in Roelke v. Roelke3 the wife, who success-
fully sought the divorce, complained that for one year prior to the
single act of violence, her husband had constantly used abusive language
when speaking to her. This would seem to indicate the presence of a
course of conduct, preceding the single act, which developed to the
point of a great violence. However, the court said that the previous
course of conduct must be more than mere unhappy relations:
A single act of physical violence does not always justify
divorce, even in connection with previous unhappy relations.
Much must always depend upon the condition in life of the
parties, their sensibilities, and the effect of the acts complained
of upon the party complaining; and all of these matters are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the trial court, and cannot be
so well known to the appellate court. 4
The second path of development began as early as 1888, when the
court recognized in Crichton v. Crichton5 that a course of conduct
which was not consummated by a high degree of physical violence could
still justify a divorce if the results of the act were great mental anguish
and a certain degree of impairment of the spouse's health.
It was not until several years later, however, that the courts began
to generally recognize a third development: psychological cruel and in-
human treatment.6 Thus, even a passive course of conduct, such as
failing to aid a wife when she needs help, and prolonged periods of
silence broken by abusive language, may be cruel and inhuman treat-
ment. Such as the case in Hiecke v. Hiecke7 where the court said
that
It does not seem,, by the later authorities, that actual impair-
ment of the health, caused by ill treatment without violence,
actual, threatened, or probable is essential to cruel and inhuman
treatment. If the conduct was such as naturally to cause a great
mental suffering to the plaintiff and to render impairment of
health probable, so that further efforts to perform the conjugal
duties would be dangerous. 8
Thus, we see that there are three phases of development in the Wis-
consin law on cruel and inhuman treatment: (1) the characteristically
3 103 Wis. 204, 78 N.W. 923 (1899).
4 Id. at 206, 78 N.W. at 923.
573 Wis. 59, 40 N.W. 638 (1888).GHiecke v. Hiecke, 163 Wis. 171, 157 N.W. 747 (1916); Bird v. Bird, 171 Wis.
219, 177 N.W. 4 (1920); Mayhew v. Mayhew, 239 Wis. 489, 1 N.W. 2d 184(1942); Voigt v .Voigt, 21 Wis. 2d 421, 124 N.W. 2d 640 (1963); Grosberg
v. Grosberg, 269 Wis. 165, 68 N.W. 2d 725 (1955) ; Heffernan v. Heffernan,
27 Wis. 2d 307, 134 N.W. 2d 439 (1965).
7163 Wis. 171, 157 N.W. 747 (1916).
S Id. at 177, 157 N.W. 2d at 750.
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violent physical act preceded by a course of conduct; (2) a hybrid
development consisting of a milder course of conduct superimposed
on mental abuses tending to humiliate the other spouse; (3) psycho-
logical attacks on the sanity and general mental health of the other
party.
Many of the courts throughout the United States recognize the
fact that in certain situations a divorce action grounded on cruelty may
lie, even though only a single act is offered as evidence. A leading
Missouri case on single act holds that, "It is not every act of cruelty on
the part of the husband that will entitle a wife to a divorce. A single
slight blow, slap, or push not threatening bodily harm is not sufficient
for divorce under the statute."9 The court further held that the single
act must be more than one which merely causes theother spouse a
certain amount of indignity. Generally, cruelty statutes which include
indignities as possible grounds, however, require a series of these to
constitute sufficient matter for a divorce action.
The Missouri court gave further definition to the state statute when
it denied the husband a divorce in Weisheyer v. Weisheyer.10 The case
was based upon the wife's single act of striking him with a candlestick.
The candlestick was very light, and broke the moment it touched the
husband's arm, causing him little or no injury.
Of all the cases in this area, the one which presented the most un-
equivocal single act was Crabtree v. Crabtree."- Here the defendant-
wife, with no previous history of any such conduct, wildly confronted
and threatened her husband with a straightedge razor. She cut his
throat with the razor and proceeded to chase him about their home,
slashing and cutting him on the arms and back as they ran. He ran out
of the house and over to the home of a neighbor, with his wife in hot
pursuit. Before they managed to subdue her, she had slashed him again.
The husband sued for divorce and based his complaint on his wife's
"cruel and inhuman treatment which rendered cohabitation unsafe and
improper.1 2 The Arkansas court held that, although the wife had since
come out of this sudden fit and now sought reconciliation, she had
perpetrated an act which rendered future cohabitation with plaintiff
unsafe. Therefore, the divorce was granted.
In the case of Wiggins v. Wiggins,' the wife in an outburst of
temper shot at her husband with a shotgun, narrowly missing him.
OJohnston v. Johnston, 260 S.W. 770, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924).
'o0 Weisheyer v. Weisheyer, 6 S.W. 2d 989 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928). However, in
Thomas v. Thomas, 288 S.W. 2d 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956), the wife's single
act of driving the husband's relatives out of the house and calling them
unbelievers was found to be a sufficient basis, in the light of past conduct,
to grant the husband a divorce.
21 154 Ark. 401, 242 S.W. 804, 24 A.L.R. 918 (1922).1 2 ARK. CODE §427 (Williams, 1934).
13 171 Pa. Super. 298, 90 A. 2d 275 (1952).
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The Pennsylvania court found that the evidence justified a divorce based
on cruel and barbarous treatment.
In the Nevada case of Johnson v. Johnson,14 the husband, on one
occasion, beat his wife. The result of the assault was a fractured rib,
bruises about the head, and other injuries to the wife. The court found
defendant-husband guilty of extreme cruelty, without cause or provoca-
tion, which caused plaintiff intense suffering and seriously interfered
with her health and made future cohabitation impossible.
The previous cases illustrate situations where the conduct of the
defendant was quite outrageous. However, some courts have seemed
to indicate that a single act of a less volatile nature may also be a basis
for a divorce action.
An Ohio Court of Appeals, interpreting the indignities section of
its cruelty statute, flirted with the possibility of a single act when it
said there must be a plan or purpose "calculated by the defendant to
permanently destroy the peace of mind and happiness of one of the
parties to the marriage and thereby render the marital relation in-
tolerable." '15
Most commonly, the use of cursing and vile language on a single
occasion, even when coupled with some physical violence, is not enough
upon which to grant a divorce, especially if it occured during an argu-
ment between the spouses.16 But one court has said, via obiter dicta, that
violent language may be sufficient if the conduct of the parties goes far
beyond the fairly common marital argument, resulting in the impair-
ment of the health of one of the parties, or creates in the individual
a reasonable fear for his personal safety if he or she continues to live
in the same household.17
Various state courts have made many statements as to what they
feel may or may not be a sufficient act. In Illinois, the court is bound
by its cruelty statute which requires that the acts be more than one in
number. Thus, two probable instances of the types of cruelty thus far
mentioned could give grounds for a divorce.
In Connecticut, the single act must be one which constitutes "in-
tolerable cruelty," that is, the act must be intolerable in the sense of
rendering continuance of the marital relation unbearable.' 8 The Mary-
14Johnson v. Johnson, 76 Nev. 318, 353 P. 2d 449 (1960).
15 Dean v. Dean, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 126 N.E. 2d 819, 820 (Ohio App. 1953).
16 Scheinin v. Scheinin, 200 Md. 282, 89 A. 2d 609 (1952) ; Souza v. Souza, 332
Mass. 316, 125 N.E. 2d 120 (1954); Tillery v. Tillery, 304 S.W. 2d 156 (Civ.
App. 1957); Rankin v. Rankin, 181 Pa. Super. 414, 124 A. 2d 639 (1956);
Brown v. Brown, - R.I.- , 177 A. 2d 380 (1962); Brown v. Brown, 217
Ga. 671, 124 S.E. 2d 399 (1962); Gordon v. Gordon, 270 Wis. 332, 71 N.W.
2d 386 (1955).
17Johnson v. Johnson, 76 Nev. 318, 353 P. 2d 449 (1960) ; Anderson v. Ander-
son, 68 Cal. App. 218, 228 Pac. 715 (1924).
Is Beck v. Beck, 102 Conn. 755, 129 A. 275 (1925); McEvoy v. McEvoy, 99
Conn. 427, 122 A. 100, 102 (1923) where the court said: "It is only when
the cumulative effect of the defendant's cruelty upon the suffering victim
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land court, in dealing with the problem of single act of cruelty, has
held that it must be more than slight in character and must indicate an
intention to do serious bodily harm. 19
A reasonable, or even somewhat forceful request for normal marital
relations is generally held not to constitute cruelty 20 This is true even
when the other spouse resists, or at least finds such an experience
unpleasant. As long as the requesting spouse does not intentionally
impair the health or endanger the safety of the other spouse, his acts
do not constitute cruelty.
The reprimanding of children in front of the other spouse, even
though the discipline may be somewhat harsh, is generally not held
to be cruelty.21 But the Louisiana court has said, via obiter dicta, that
such conduct may become a basis for a divorce action if it is carried
on in the presence of the other spouse "solely to give him grief and
affect his health." 2 2
The courts have found that there are many ways of seriously im-
pairing a spouse's health. Among these is the questioning of the other's
sanity. If the party is somewhat nervous in the first place, a spouse's
conduct in this area might do much to further unsettle his mate's
mental health. However, here again, the conduct which it takes to
establish an intolerable situation generally amounts to a course of
conduct.2 3 The situation may also be such that the complaining spouse
has become such that the public and personal objects of matrimony have been
destroyed beyond rehabilitation that the condition of fact contemplated by
the intolerable cruelty clause of the statute . . . should be found to exist."
(Citation omitted.)
19 Hoshall v. Hoshall, 51 Md. 72, 34 Am. Rep. 298 (1878) ; Hawkins v. Hawkins,
65 Md. 104, 3 A. 2d 749 (1886) ; Shutt v. Shutt, 71 Md. 193, 17 A. 1024, 17
Am. St. Rep. 519 (1889); Goodhues v. Goodhues, 90 Md. 292, 44 A. 990(1899) ; Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 127 A. 743, 744, 745 (1925) where
the court stated: "A single act of violence, slight in character, does not ordi-
narily constitute cruelty of treatment as a cause for divorce a mensa ...
[I t depends on whether such single act indicates an intention to do serious
bodily harm or is of such a character as to threaten serious danger in the
future," See also McKane v. McKane, 152 Md. 515, 137 A. 288 (1927) ; Martin
v. Martin, 159 Md. 46, 149 A. 616 (1930); Gellar v. Gellar, 159 Md. 236, 150
A. 717 (1930) ; Bonwit v. Bonwit, 169 Md. 189, 181 A. 237 (1937) ; Stem v.
Stern, 183 Md. 59, 36 A. 2d 695 (1944) ; Collins v. Collins, 184 Md. 655, 42 A.
2d 680 (1945).
20 Record v. Record, 244 Iowa 743, 57 N.W. 2d 911 (1953).
21Addison v. Addison, 149 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1963), here the stepson repri-
manded was larger than the father.
22Dunlap v. Dunlap, 49 La. Ann. 1696, 22 So. 929 (1897).
23Heffernan v. Heffernan, 27 Wis. 2d 307, 134 N.W. 2d 439 (1965) ; Reinhard v.
Reinhard, 96 Wis. 555, 558, 71 N.W. 803, 804 (1897) where the court said:
"The effect of such conduct upon a nervous, sensitive woman can better be
imagined than described, and may have seriously injured the plaintiff's health,
as found by the court. This court has repeatedly held that personal violence,
whether actual or threatened, or even gross abusive language, is not abso-
lutely essential to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment." See also Mayhew
v. Mayhew, 239 Wis. 489, 1 N.W. 2d 184 (1942); Voigt v. Voigt, 21 Wis. 2d
421, 124 N.W. 2d 184 (1963) ; Crichton v. Crichton, 73 Wis. 59, 40 N.W. 638(1888) where defendant-husband's verbal abuse of wife and children and
series of threats held sufficient.
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is not himself the direct victim of such abuse, that is, for some reason
the other spouse has slipped into a frame of mind which makes life
unbearable for the healthy spouse.24
It will be difficult for a court to judge the seriousness of a single
act because a distinction must be made by the courts between a series
of marital difficulties and a cruel course of conduct. Often when a
plaintiff is incensed or injured by a single act, he or she may look
back upon recent problems and feel that they actually constituted
cruelty. This is where the trial court must step in and decide whether
or not there was a history of such treatment by the defendant. If the
court does not find such a course of conduct, it must determine whether
the background and social level of the parties is such that the single
act is a sufficient basis upon which to grant a divorce. The court must
determine whether the act was of such a nature as to place the com-
plaining spouse in reasonable fear or apprehension of harm or danger
to health. It must inquire whether the act complained of would render
the couple's continued living together impossible.2 5 Generally, the
Wisconsin trial courts reached such a conclusion, only when there had
been a course of cruel conduct, culminating in a physically violent or,
at least, an overtly cruel act. The conduct must put the innocent spouse
in a state of fear for his or her safety. 6
In conclusion, it is difficult to ascertain just where Wisconsin stands
in relation to other single act jurisdictions. The evidence given in the
case was minimal, making it impossible to ascertain exactly how violent
the single striking blow of the husband was; it certainly wasn't an
aggravated battery. In fact, whether Merten is even a single act case is
open to speculation because the wife had instituted a divorce action
a year earlier, but had discontinued it in its early stages.2 7
Since Merten is not definitive of the degree of mistreatment neces-
sary in a single act case, one may only theorize on what sort of single
act will be sufficient. The single act most likely to be grounds, of
course, is the act of physical violence. The cases involving non-physical
acts, such as mental harassment of the spouse, would seem to require
a persistent course of conduct,28 but as discussed supra, the door has
24 Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Wis. 186, 83 N.W. 291 (1900), the fact that the hus-
band became sullen after his wife refused to supply money for a business
scheme was held insufficient; Hiecke v. Hiecke, 163 Wis. 171, 157 N.W. 747
(1916); Gordon v. Gordon, 270 Wis. 332, 71 N.W. 2d 386 (1955), wife on
many occasions was unreasonably angry and hostile towards husband.
25 Hiecke v. Hiecke, supra note 24; Bird v. Bird, 171 Wis. 219, 177 N.W. 4
(1920); Voigt v. Voigt, 21 Wis. 2d 421, 124 N.W. 2d 640 (1936); Gordon v.
Gordon, 270 Wis. 332, 71 N.W. 2d 386 (1955); Heffernan v. Heffernan, 27
Wis. 2d 307, 134 N.W. 2d 439 (1965).
26 Hansen, Wisconsin's Family Code-After Five Years, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 69,
71 (1965).
27 Brief for Appellant, p. 119, Merten v. National Manufacturer's Bank of
Neenah, 26 Wis. 2d 181, 131 N.W. 2d 868 (1965).
28 Crichton v. Crichton, 73 Wis. 59, 40 N.W. 638 (1888); Mayhew v. Mayhew,
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been left open by several courts for such non-physical acts amounting
to gross humiliation,29 severly punishing children in the presence of the
other spouse,3 0 and vile language.31 In light of these cases, then, the
sine qua non does not seem to be whether the act is physical or non-
physical, but rather, what the effect of the act is on the other spouse.
It is submitted that what the court will look to in future single
act cases is whether the conduct of the offending spouse is unreason-
able in that it has, or may have, a detrimental effect upon either the
physical or mental health of the offended spouse, thereby rendering
the marriage state intolerable. This is the reason for the often pene-
trating inquiry by a court into the background and social status of
the parties to a divorce action. Along with the development of our
society has come a degree of social refinement which no longer
tolerates "wife beating" as an accepted practice. The age we live in
has required our divorce courts to look seriously at conduct by one
human being which lowers the dignity of another. The courts, during
this transition, have been distilling the old clear cut law in order to
refine it to modern living conditions.
Thus, at the present time, it seems that a physically violent single
act is clearly grounds for divorce because the health of the affected
party is visibly impaired. Also, since many of the courts today are
searching the facts in order to see if the act is likely to recur, i.e., if
impairment of the health is probable, it would seem that many non-
physical acts may also constitute cruel and inhuman treatment.
This is not to imply that the court in Merten greatly relaxed the
grounds for divorce in Wisconsin; this remedy is now, and will in
all likelihood continue to be, a possibility only in extremely difficult
and delicate situations. The difficulty created by Merten is that since
little outright indication is given as to when a single act may give a
spouse sufficient grounds, much can be implied upon analysis. As life
continues to grow more complex, it is a verity that the law of domestic
relations will be forced to cope with these complexities. It seems upon
analysis, that Merten may well be a key to a new era of interpretation
in this area of divorce law in Wisconsin, but its analysis and reasoning
leave much to speculation.
MICHAEL B. RiCm
239 Wis. 489, 1 N.W. 2d 184 (1942); Grosberg v. Grosberg, 269 Wis. 165,
68 N.W. 2d 725 (1955); Chapman v. Chapman, 3 Wis. 2d 559, 89 N.W. 2d
207 (1958) ; Voigt v. Voigt, 21 Wis. 2d 421, 124 N.W. 2d 184 (1963) ; Heffer-
nan v. Heffernan, 27 Wis. 2d 307, 134 N.W. 2d 439 (1965).
29 Fomby v. Fomby, 329 S.W. 2d 111 (Civ. App. 1959), where the court held
that a false charge of infidelity constitutes cruel treatment. The cruelty sec-
tion of the Wisconsin statute is very similar to that of Texas, but see Garot
v. Garot, 24 Wis. 2d 88, 128 N.W. 2d 393 (1964).
30 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 49 La. Ann. 1696, 22 So. 929 (1897).
31 Cases cited note 16 supra.
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